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Does domestic political unrest deter foreign direct investment (FDI)? And what are the longer term impacts of unrest
upon the market? Most theories suggest that investors are deterred by unrest. However, empirical research returns only
marginal support. We argue that these mixed results stem from the conflation of the distinct tactics and outcomes of
political unrest. Violent forms of unrest increase uncertainty and risk. By comparison, nonviolent forms of unrest are
shown to more frequently achieve their goals and increase the prospects for democratic change and market stability. In
addition, investors avoid markets where campaigns have ended in failure, defined as the campaign not achieving their
stated political aims. Failed campaigns often precipitate a cycle of unrest that create greater uncertainty over the long-
term stability of a state. We find strong evidence in favor of our propositions, even after taking political motivation and
non-random selection into account.
How does domestic political unrest affect the market?
Domestic unrest is increasingly common in the post-
World War II period.2 It surpasses interstate conflict in
both the number of incidents and in its human cost (Kal-
dor 1999; Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg,
and Strand 2002). The frequency and severity of unrest
has piqued academic interest in its causes and conse-
quences. Existing work finds, among other things, that
unrest heightens uncertainty over democratic transitions
(Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001) and
increases the likelihood of violence at home and in
neighboring states (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Lake
and Rothchild 1998).
Unrest’s effects on the market are less well understood.
Recent research shows that political unrest stunts growth
and development (Collier 2003; Sachs 2006).3 However,
the precise channels through which unrest affects growth,
development, and the market more generally, remain
open to investigation. In this paper, we explore one of
these channels: how unrest deters foreign direct
investment (FDI).4 We focus on two key questions. First,
to what extent does unrest deter inward investment dur-
ing the period of ongoing instability? Second, does unrest
have longer-term effects on investment flows after insta-
bility ends?
Literature on international investment shows that mar-
kets characterized by risk—whether that risk derives from
autocratic institutions (Jensen 2008), corruption
(Benassy-Quere, Coupet, and Mayer 2007), or a myriad
other factors—find it difficult to attract FDI. However, in
spite of these findings, there is only limited evidence that
political unrest deters inward FDI. Some studies show
that less FDI flows into countries undergoing periods of
unrest (Schneider and Frey 1985) while others cast doubt
on the durability of this relationship (B€uthe and Milner
2008). This empirical ambiguity highlights a shortcoming
in past approaches. Previous work, with a few exceptions
(Busse and Hefeker 2007; Li 2006), pays too little atten-
tion to variation across periods of unrest, particularly with
respect to the tactics political actors use. Yet, the tactics
actors use—that is, whether they employ violence or non-
violence—are a crucial determinant of the success of
political campaigns. Specifically, non-violent campaigns
are far more likely to successfully achieve their goals
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2 “Domestic political unrest” is defined here to encompass the full range
of campaigns led by non-state actors challenging a government, including
strikes, protests, riots, and armed rebellions. We refer to unrest, instability,
and conflict interchangeably.
3 Low growth is itself related to political unrest. There is evidence that
poor economic performance—defined as low growth and high inequality—
increases the likelihood of unrest. As a result, political instability leads to
“conflict traps" in which unrest’s deleterious effects on the economy foster a
cycle of continued unrest.
4 We do not make a claim about the net welfare benefits of FDI. A
lengthy literature speaks to this topic and finds mixed evidence regarding
whether FDI promotes growth and development. We only assume that markets
want to attract foreign investment.
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(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Successful campaigns, in
turn, are less vulnerable to conflict renewal.
These relationships have implications for how we
understand unrest’s effects on the market. The extent to
which unrest deters FDI is conditioned by the same fac-
tors that affect political stability broadly—that is, violence
and success. We assume that capital is sensitive to uncer-
tainty about the future. Investors are wary of markets
where there is a high likelihood of continued political
instability. We make two main arguments. First, FDI flows
are lower into markets experiencing violent unrest than
into markets not experiencing violence. Violence signals
greater risk to the market because, for the reasons just
cited, it is associated strongly with a greater chance of
prolonged instability.5 Violent campaigns are longer in
duration and more likely to result in additional unrest.
Second, the costs of unrest likely extend beyond its ini-
tial duration. We argue that unrest’s longer term effects
are shaped by how campaigns end. Specifically, successful
campaigns are far less likely to precipitate subsequent
(violent) unrest. Unsuccessful campaigns, on the con-
trary, often foreshadow additional instability in the near
future. FDI inflows should therefore be lower into states
where the specter of continued instability looms over the
market—that is, where campaigns have unsuccessful out-
comes.
We test the validity of these claims using data on politi-
cal unrest disaggregated by tactical type and outcome
and find strong support for our predictions. Unrest (of
all forms) is mildly associated with reduced FDI during
the years of ongoing instability. However, a closer look,
in which we disaggregate campaigns based on their tac-
tics, reveals that only violent unrest deters investment.
Non-violent unrest is statistically indistinguishable from
periods of peace. We then explore the legacy unrest
leaves on the market and find that success is a significant
determinant of FDI after instability ends. Looking at a
sample of post-unrest years, we show that markets attract
comparatively more FDI in the wake of successful cam-
paigns than they do after unsuccessful ones. This result
holds even if success means additional turmoil from any
resultant secession or change of regime. We take special
note of the possibility of selection bias in the estimates
and find that the results are robust to corrections for
non-random selection into unrest.
We conclude that a fuller account of how political
unrest affects the market must consider variation in the
precise nature of instability. The findings suggest a poten-
tial source of ambiguity in the current evidence. More-
over, the results point to a specific channel through
which unrest shapes states’ longer term development
trajectories. Campaigns that end successfully leave a com-
paratively less damaging legacy on the market. This evi-
dence is important given that conflict’s deleterious effects
on the domestic economy foster a cycle of instability.
States emerging from successful campaigns may be better
positioned to avoid slipping into a “conflict trap” (Collier
2003).
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the rel-
evant literature on political unrest and FDI, before outlin-
ing our own logic, which suggests that variation in the
tactics and outcomes of campaigns of unrest account for
differential impacts of unrest on FDI inflows both during
and after unrest. Second, we present our research design
and evidence, including a variety of tests designed to
probe the durability of our results. In the final section,
we highlight the broader implications of these findings.
Background and Theory
Existing work emphasizes foreign direct investment’s sen-
sitivity to political risk. FDI is characterized by high sunk
costs and comparatively lower mobility, which implies that
non-negligible costs are incurred when exiting markets.
As a result, investors are wary of uncertainty in host mar-
kets. There is strong evidence that risky markets enjoy
relatively lower levels of inward investment, whether that
risk derives from fear of expropriation (Li 2009; Biglaiser
and DeRouen 2006), government corruption (Habib and
Zurawicki 2002), armed interstate conflict (Barbieri and
Reuveny 2005), or a variety of other factors. By extension,
it ought to likewise hold that domestic political unrest,
broadly defined, deters FDI.
In spite of this literature, there is only mixed evidence
that domestic political unrest shapes inward investment
flows. Early survey work showed that firms placed unrest
high on their lists of priorities when selecting among host
markets (Agarwal 1980; Aharoni 1966). In addition, foun-
dational econometric studies demonstrated that political
unrest and concerns over property rights protections
where important determinants of FDI flows (Schneider
and Frey 1985). As a result, states with histories of unrest
received lower levels of inward FDI than their more stable
counterparts.
However, there have been a series of studies that cast
doubt on this relationship. Several early papers found
that the correlation between unrest and FDI greatly
diminishes (or vanishes entirely) once controlling for
economic factors such as market potential (Bennett and
Green 1972; Greene and LaPalombara 1974). More
recent studies echo these results. Some note that FDI is
now more vertical than in previous decades and, there-
fore, the nature of the risks firms face has changed
(B€uthe and Milner 2008). Furthermore, increasingly wide-
spread democratic institutions and greater numbers of
formal interstate economic agreements both act to insti-
tutionalize promises made by governments to respect the
rights of investors (Jensen 2008).
Empirical ambiguity in the relationship between unrest
and investment derives from the fact that too few studies
appreciate variation in the nature of unrest.6 Many stud-
ies conflate the tactics and outcomes of episodes of politi-
cal unrest, relying on one aggregate indicator of
instability—for example, B€uthe and Milner (2008).7 That
simplified approach helps identify whether a broad rela-
tionship exists between unrest and FDI. However, it over-
looks important differences across periods of political
unrest, particularly with respect to the tactics that cam-
paigns use to achieve their goals and the outcomes of
those campaigns.
5 Even if non-violent campaigns are larger in scale with respect to levels of
participation, they more regularly result in stable political outcomes.
6 The most notable exception to this recent trend is Li (2006). Indeed, Li
offers the most direct and systematic extant assessment of the puzzle priori-
tized in this paper. Combining empirical and theoretical innovation, Li
focuses upon investors’ anticipation of the onset and impact of political
unrest. Li distinguishes between three types of violent unrest: transnational ter-
rorism, civil war, and interstate conflict. His analyses demonstrate that, with
some exceptions, unanticipated forms of violent unrest have a more detrimen-
tal impact on investments than do their anticipated counterparts.
7 This is typically taken from the Banks (2008) dataset, which provides an
index of unrest comprised of, for example, the number of strikes, rebellions,
and coups that occur in a given country-year.
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In this article, we argue that understanding the rela-
tionship between political unrest and the market requires
a closer look at variation across periods of instability. This
is not just a research design concern. There are strong
theoretical reasons to think that variation in tactics and
outcomes matter for the impact that unrest has on invest-
ment flows. In short, violent tactics and unsuccessful cam-
paigns both indicate greater uncertainty than do non-
violent tactics and successful campaigns. As a result, we
should only expect investors to respond to unrest under
certain conditions, thereby helping clarify the existing
ambiguity in the findings. We elaborate on these claims
in the following section.
Does Unrest Deter FDI?
Our argument starts from the assumption that investors
consider the relative stability of a country when selecting
among potential host markets. We do not assume that
investors have full information. We simply assume that
they are wary of markets perceived to exhibit high levels
of instability (either today or in the future).8
Existing work shows that investment levels are linked
inextricably to political instability. Specifically, FDI levels
are positively correlated with stability (Busse and Hefeker
2007). This is because stable political environments create
more attractive investment opportunities for firms. Stud-
ies show that firms invest more heavily in markets that
protect property rights (Markusen 2001), have reliable
legal systems (Asiedu 2006), and have transparent regula-
tions (Jensen 2008). All of these traits help firms deter-
mine more accurately their expected returns on their
investments. Under conditions of instability, this is more
difficult because changes in the regulatory and legal land-
scapes are harder to anticipate. For example, existing
works shows that instability leads to a depreciation in
property rights protection (Svensson 1998).
In addition, FDI’s sunk costs leave firms vulnerable to
obsolescing bargaining power and to fears of outright
expropriation. Stable policy environments significantly
reduce these risks by limiting ad hoc opportunism on the
part of the state (Olson 1993). In light of these reasons,
firms will choose more stable political climates, on aver-
age, when selecting from their menus of potential host
markets.
Firms’ sensitivity to risk has implications for levels of
FDI flowing into markets experiencing unrest. The litera-
ture cited above provides a strong theoretical and eviden-
tial basis for thinking that any form of instability
potentially deters inward investment. The same relation-
ship ought to hold for domestic political unrest. Indeed,
the occurrence of everything from a large-scale strike to a
civil war can have a disruptive effect on the domestic
economy (see, for example, Murdoch and Sandler (2004)
and Collier (1999)). These incidents can lead to new
costs for firms, including the renegotiation of labor prac-
tices (in the case of strikes), to destroyed productive
capacity (in the case of civil war), or any number of
direct costs to the firm that reduce returns on invest-
ment.
More generally, unrest may create heightened uncer-
tainty over policy as governments move to tighten the
grip on opposition groups. Legal systems may be relaxed
when governments attempt to repress the opposition (for
example, the declaration of emergency law in Egypt
following the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and martial
law in the Philippines in the face of civil conflict under
President Ferdinand Marcos). Governments’ incentives to
expropriate foreign assets may also increase when the
security of their tenure is uncertain (Li 2009). Thus,
unrest can exacerbate precisely the kinds of political risks
to which firms are sensitive.
Firms’ investment decisions are made more compli-
cated by the fact that investors may be unsure about
future risks when unrest first occurs. Given that investors
have incomplete information about the severity, duration,
and outcome of conflicts, the “safest” action may be to
entirely avoid a market in which any form of unrest
breaks out (Li 2006). For these reasons, risk-averse
investors may be uniformly pessimistic about markets
experiencing a period of unrest. Thus, our initial expec-
tation is that,
H1. FDI flows are lower into states experiencing a period of
unrest than into states not experiencing unrest.
Our first hypothesis focuses on firms’ general wariness
of the political instability that may results from periods of
unrest. However, this logic does not consider variation in
the precise nature of unrest. Instead, it assumes that all
periods of unrest have the potential to deter FDI. Our
core insight is that investors’ perceptions of stability are
conditioned by specific traits of unrest. Not all periods of
unrest are created equal. They vary with respect to politi-
cal motivation, breadth of participation, duration, and
numerous other characteristics. These traits are unlikely
to provide the market with precisely the same informa-
tion about the short- and long-term prospects for political
stability. Consequently, campaigns will vary in their effects
on the market.
Here we focus on two sources of variation known to
affect stability: the tactics campaigners use and the out-
comes of those campaigns. First, it is necessary to distin-
guish campaigns by their predominant tactical form—
that is, whether they employ violence or non-violence as
their primary mode of contestation. Existing work shows
that a greater proportion of campaigns leading to the
successful removal of governments and significant
changes to state policies rely on non-violent resistance
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This pattern owes to the
fact that non-violent movements typically enjoy higher lev-
els of participation by regular citizens than do violent
movements. On average, non-violent campaigns have four
times as many participants as violent ones. In addition,
20 of the largest 25 campaigns between 1900 and 2010
were non-violent. This is partly because the costs incurred
by individuals are considerably lower when campaigns are
non-violent (Kurzman 1996).9
Greater participation is also observed amongst elite
groups separate from the general civilian population.
Non-violent campaigns are significantly more likely to
8 One challenge to this assumption is the possibility that some investors
may be attracted to, rather than deterred by, unrest. Political instability may
create space for opportunism by investors, allowing them to get better deals
from rent-seeking politicians or regulators. However, these opportunities are
likely to be industry-specific and idiosyncratic in nature, not something that
applies to the entire market. We do not test predictions about specific firms
in this paper. However, if this is true, then it would bias our results against
finding support for our theory, thereby creating a more conservative test.
9 Fewer people may support the use of violence in principle. Moreover,
the risks borne by participants are considerably lower when tactics are non-vio-
lent.
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result in defections from the state’s military and govern-
ment. The literature on non-violence shows that the loy-
alty of government officials shifts more toward campaigns
challenging the government as the probability of success
increases (Greene and LaPalombara 1974; McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Furthermore, these defections
are more likely when the campaign has a large number
of supporters (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).
Both of these processes—more widespread public par-
ticipation and greater numbers of defections from the
regime—are fundamental to the greater ability of non-
violent movements to successfully undermine autocratic
institutions and despotic leaders (DeNardo 1985; Wein-
stein 2007), as illustrated by the successes of movements
to overthrow Marcos in the Philippines and the Kuchma
regime in Ukraine. Following a rigged election in 1986
that saw incumbent Ferdinand Marcos comfortably defeat
his opponent Cory Aquino, many members of the regime
openly denounced him and Filipino military forces set up
bases around the capital of Manila to successfully aid the
throngs of pro-Aquino protesters in overthrowing the sit-
ting president (Montiel and Chiongbian 1991).
In Ukraine, millions of citizens amassed in Kiev’s Inde-
pendence Square and across the country in reaction to
allegations of vote fraud in the 2004 presidential election.
Demanding justice for the opposition candidate, Victor
Yushchenko, Ukrainians participating in this “Orange Rev-
olution” succeeded in winning the support of members of
the armed forces, as well as ultimately achieving the
removal of incumbent Leonid Kuchma (Karatnycky 2005).
Indeed, it appears that members of the Security Service
of Ukraine (the SBU, an organization that succeeded the
KGB in the country) even warned opposition leaders that
a crackdown had been ordered to take place, and several
high-ranking officers successfully urged the commander
in charge of operations against the protesters to scale
back the military assault (Chivers 2005).
The subset of non-violent cases is also increasingly likely
to sow the seeds for successful democratic transitions. The
average 5-year change in Polity scores for states where cam-
paigns have been non-violent is 7.22 [SD: 6.12].10 In states
with violent unrest, this change is a miniscule 0.92 (SD:
5.10). Democratization, in spite of the difficulties associated
with transition, heralds the arrival of institutions that
increase respect for the rule of law and the protection of
property. Themarket is known to respond favorably to these
conditions, primarily because they reduce uncertainty over
the security of (and returns on) investments (Jensen 2008).
For example, after Zambian president Frederick Chiluba
announced his intention to run for a third (and unconsti-
tutional) term in office, citizens amassed in non-violent
protests across the country. These protests, alongside addi-
tional pressures, including the threat of impeachment by
the legislature, ultimately resulted in Chiluba resigning
from the presidency. This precipitated broad-ranging dem-
ocratic reforms. Following Chiluba’s ouster, FDI as a pro-
portion of Zambia’s GDP rose from approximately 2% in
2001 to just over 8% in 2002 and continues to range
between 5% and 11% to the present, while the country
continues to develop more democratic institutions.
Non-violent campaigns therefore exhibit a number of
traits that ought to assuage investors’ apprehensions
over the stability and safety of the market. Non-violent
campaigns enjoy wider-spread support. This support, in
turn, is an important determinant of the likelihood of
a successful outcome and, in some cases, democratiza-
tion. The result of these campaigns ought to be more
political stability. Or, in cases where they precipitate
additional reforms, these reforms ought to result in a
shift toward the kind of policy environment conducive
to FDI—namely, democratic institutions and processes
that enhance stability. As a result, international inves-
tors perceive less risk in markets where unrest is non-
violent.
H2. FDI flows are lower into states experiencing a period of vio-
lent unrest than into states experiencing a period of non-violent
unrest.
What are the Long-Term Effects of Unrest?
In this paper, we are interested in more than the immedi-
ate effects unrest has on the market. Political instability’s
costs are not confined to years of unrest. Rather, unrest
can leave a lasting legacy on the market, dampening
investment flows long after hostilities end. We argue that
post-unrest investment levels are shaped by campaign out-
comes, which have important consequences for longer
term stability.
As emphasized, the relative attractiveness of non-violent
campaigns to potential participants means that non-vio-
lent campaigns are significantly more likely to end in suc-
cess—that is, the achievement of the campaign’s stated
aims (DeNardo 1985; Weinstein 2007; Chenoweth and
Stephan 2011). These aims vary significantly and may
include regime change, secession, or a myriad other polit-
ical and/or social reforms. Instinctively, undergoing such
reforms may signal additional instability to the market,
depressing rather than promoting inward investment.
Indeed, many theories of long-term investments (such as
FDI) emphasize the importance of policy consistency over
rapid and large-scale change. Stable political climates fos-
ter investment, even if these climates are non-demo-
cratic.11 This kind of logic suggests that campaigns that
successfully bring about significant policy changes
increase uncertainty and deter FDI.
However, there are two reasons to think that successful
campaigns leave a less damaging long-term legacy on the
market than do unsuccessful campaigns. First, recent
work on political institutions and FDI suggests that, in
fact, investors favor democratic environments even if they
carry with them some risk of reform (Jensen et al. 2012;
Jensen 2008). As mentioned, these institutions are associ-
ated with traits firms desire: support for the rule of law,
the protection of property rights, and comparatively more
predictable policy reforms when regime change does
occur (Feng 2001). Increased transparency in the politi-
cal system, as opposed to autocratic regimes, means that
the market better anticipates policy changes that affect
the returns on investments. Evidence supports this claim;
successful political reforms result in higher levels of
inward FDI (Brada, Kutan, and Yigit 2006).
Across our sample, 62 campaigns ended successfully
and 78 ended unsuccessfully. The average 5-year change
in the democracy score (using Polity) of states with cam-
10 Polity scores are located on a 20-point scale from 10 (most autocratic)
to 10 (most democratic).
11 One implication is that autocratic regimes can be as attractive, if not
more attractive, than democratic regimes where uncertainty over electoral out-
comes—and any subsequent reforms—generates risk in the marketplace
(Oneal 1994; Li and Resnick 2003).
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paigns that ended successfully is 6.05 [SD: 6.30]. Com-
pare that to the average change in democracy for states
with unsuccessful campaigns of 3.07 [SD: 6.33].12 While
these statistics do not capture the precise cost of transi-
tions, they reinforce a straightforward logic: states where
campaigns are successful become more democratic. This
pattern holds almost by definition since most of these
movements (75%) are directed toward achieving regime
change.
Second, and more simply, successful campaigns are
less likely to precipitate additional unrest. Even if the
reform process is costly, the prospects for additional
unrest decrease over time. Approximately 35% of states
experience renewed unrest within 5 years of a failed
campaign. The proportion of states relapsing into
unrest is slightly lower for successful campaigns (32%)
in the short-term. However, this difference becomes
more substantial over time. Looking at the period of
10 years after the end of unrest, 61% of states with
unsuccessful campaigns relapse, compared to 54% of
successful ones.13
Crucially, it is not just whether a state relapses into
another period of unrest. The nature of this renewed
conflict is even more revealing. There is renewed violence
in the wake of successful campaigns roughly 50% of the
time (within 5 years). Conversely, violence breaks out
nearly 80% of the time in those cases in which there was
previously an unsuccessful campaign. So while there is a
non-negligible chance of unrest in both cases—we know
that many states experienced multiple periods of unrest
in recent history—the nature of this unrest varies.
This variation is important. Unsuccessful campaigns
are much more likely to result in a continued cycle of
unrest—one that can afflict the market for many years
into the future. Success, on the other hand, leads to com-
paratively more stability. And, even where there are costs
associated with reform, these reforms ought to create
conditions more conducive to investment. Given these
reasons, we expect that successful campaigns are signifi-
cantly less likely to affect longer term FDI flows than
their unsuccessful counterparts.
H3. In the years following unrest, FDI flows are lower into states
where campaigns have been unsuccessful than into states where
campaigns have been successful.
Our theory identifies an additional benefit of non-
violent tactics. Namely, non-violence has a far less delete-
rious effect on the market. However, we recognize that
there may be plausible alternatives to our hypotheses. For
example, non-violent campaigns may actually dampen
FDI more than violent ones precisely because these move-
ments tend to be larger (as stated above). Larger cam-
paigns may be more disruptive even if they do not do
result in physical harm to individuals or the productive
capacity of the economy. Moreover, while non-violence
increases the likelihood of success, we have acknowledged
that successful outcomes may themselves generate addi-
tional political turmoil. Success does not guarantee
peace. We have cast doubt on both of these alternative
explanations in this section. Notwithstanding our claims,
the effects of tactics and outcomes on FDI remains an
open empirical question. To account for these competing
expectations we control for both of these alternatives in
the analyses below.
Research Design
This paper explores two related processes. First, we
investigate the differential impacts of violent and non-
violent tactics on levels of FDI flows during periods of
unrest. Second, we analyze the longer-term effects of dif-
ferent campaign outcomes on investment levels after
campaigns end. Before presenting our sequence of tests,
we describe our data and how we operationalize our
concepts.
Data and Variables
To test our hypotheses, we construct a dataset on foreign
direct investment flows and political unrest across all
countries from 1975 to 2010. The data includes one
observation for each country i in each year t. There are
140 individual periods of unrest—that is, campaigns—in
the data set. These 140 periods total roughly 800 of our
approximately 7,000 country-year observations, or 11% of
the sample. These campaigns are divided nearly evenly
between those that employed predominantly violent tac-
tics (46%) and those that employed predominantly non-
violent tactics (54%). The sample is also distributed
widely across regions of the world.14
Note that the sample is defined by countries that
receive foreign aid (measured as official development
assistance from the Development Assistance Committee).
We restrict the sample because the primary form of FDI
—vertical—that flows into developing countries differs
from that of developing countries. As a result, the behav-
ior of the market can reasonably be expected to differ.15
Dependent Variables
This paper explores the effect of political unrest on
inward FDI. The dependent variable is total FDI flows
into a country i in year t. For this data we rely on the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The measure,
FDIi;t is measured in constant year 2000 U.S. dollars and
divided by GDP.16
Independent Variables
Our tests employ several independent variables relating
to the occurrence (and nature) of political unrest. These
measures derive primarily from recent work by Cheno-
weth and Stephan (2011) on campaigns of civil resis-
tance. In the first half of our analysis, we are interested
12 The comparison is even more stark over a 10-year period. States with
successful campaigns enjoy an 8.01-point increase, on average, relative to the
4.26-point increase for states with unsuccessful campaigns.
13 This difference varies based on how one treats campaigns with mixed
or “limited” success. If we instead treat limited successes as failures we observe
an even greater disparity—64% for failures and 52% for successes.
14 There are 13 cases in the Middle East (9%), 31 in Asia (22%), 46 in
Africa(33%), and 20 in the Americas (14%). The remaining 30 occurred
across Europe and the former Soviet Union.
15 In practice, this restriction does not eliminate any periods of unrest
from the data. It simply limits the countries in the reference category (no
unrest) to more comparable markets.
16 All of our reported models use FDI as measured in yearly levels. Note
that our baseline results are robust to the use of the 3- and 5-year moving
averages of FDI. Moving averages are one way to look trends in investment lev-
els over time. However, the market may adjust quite quickly to the onset of
unrest (or any other shocks) and therefore looking at yearly levels is more
precise.
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in whether unrest deters FDI during the course of the
campaign. We operationalize unrest using several mea-
sures. First, we look at the effects of political unrest
broadly defined. We construct a dichotomous indicator
of political unrest that is coded as “1” for every country-
year in which a campaign was ongoing. This measure,
Unresti;t , allows us to identify whether the occurrence of
any type of unrest deters FDI.
However, this broad measure masks the potentially
important nature of the tactics employed in each cam-
paign. Our theory predicts that violence leads to greater
reductions in foreign investment. To test this proposition,
we disaggregate unrest. We create two dichotomous indi-
cators; Violenti;t is coded “1” for every year that a cam-
paign was characterized predominantly by violence and
Non-Violenti;t is coded a “1” where campaigns were pre-
dominantly non-violent. Both of these variables are coded
as “0” in years with no ongoing campaign of that tactical
type.
The second half of our analysis looks at the legacy that
unrest leaves on the market. The theory states that the
successful resolution of a campaign, since it is associated
with greater long-term stability, encourages comparatively
greater inflows of FDI. The principal explanatory variable
in these models is Successi;t , which indicates whether a
conflict ended with the campaign achieving its aims.17
Before describing the control variables, note that pat-
terns in FDI and political unrest do not overlap—as
detailed in Figure 1. The two indicators are loosely and
negatively correlated (12%). This is because average
FDI inflows have increased steadily since the mid-1990s.
However, the peak of unrest in our sample is around the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, at least 5 years before
the most significant rise in FDI occurs. These patterns
are what we would expect; FDI increases in the wake of
turmoil in the 1980s.
Control Variables
We include several country-level predictors of FDI flows
that may confound our estimates if omitted. The first is
the level of economic development, which ought to be
positively correlated with levels of FDI. Development level
is measured as logged annual income per capita
(Incomei:t). Second, we include a dichotomous indicator
of regime type. Democracies are known to exhibit higher
levels of economic openness and to receive larger inflows
of investment than their autocratic counterparts. We mea-
sure democracy using the dichotomous coding
(Democracyi;t) provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
(2010). It is also important to distinguish FDI inflows
from other forms of inward capital, including foreign
development assistance. We include a measure Aidi;t that
is the total annual inflows of official development assis-
tance received by each state as a % of GDP.
Three other indicators of broader market activity and
regulation are likely to be associated with FDI levels. The
first is Tradei;t , which we measure as total exports plus
imports as a percentage of GDP. Trade data is collected
from the UN’s COMTRADE database and growth can be
found in WDI. The second is Growthi;t , which is the
annual percentage change in GDP. We also include a
measure for CapitalControlsi;t since flows of investment in
and out of a country are shaped fundamentally by the
existence of restrictions on the free movement of capital.
We use the Chinn-Ito Index of capital account openness
(Chinn and Ito 2008). All three of these measures should
be positively correlated with inward FDI flows.
The models also contain variables designed to address
some of the problems commonly associated with pooled
panel data. For example, FDI exhibits a high degree of tem-
poral correlation; investment levels in year t1 are a power-
ful predictor of levels in year t. To correct for this time
trend, we include a lagged dependent variable (FDIi;t1).
Moreover, our country-year unit of observation is prob-
lematic in the few instances in which there are multiple
campaigns occurring simultaneously. Campaigns coincide
in only 6% of the total number of observations in our
sample. However, it is important to ensure that we take
this overlap into account when running our estimations.
We correct for this issue in two ways. First, we have run
our estimations separately on samples using only the lon-
gest (in duration of years) and largest (in number of par-
ticipants) campaigns. This paper reports only those
models that include the longest campaigns. However, the
findings are consistent when using the alternative
approach.18 Second, even when restricting the sample, it
is important to control for the occurrence of simulta-
neous conflicts. We include a variable that flags country-
years when there are multiple ongoing campaigns
(MultipleCampaignsi;t).
Finally, the sensitivity of investors to risk is based in
part on their demand for the rule of law. Unfortunately,
many indicators of rule of law suffer from limited tempo-
ral or country coverage. To our knowledge, the most
promising candidate measure is available in the World
Bank’s World Governance Indicators. Their rule of law mea-
sure covers most of the world from 1996–2010. However,
this still severely restricts our sample (by as much as 90%
in our baseline models). Therefore we omit this variable,
RuleofLawi;t , from our main analysis.
Descriptive statistics for all of our covariates can be
found in Table 1.
Analysis and Results
To test the validity of our hypotheses, we present a
sequence of tests that address two related questions.FIG 1. Trends in Political Unrest and FDI Flows
17 Since several countries experience multiple campaigns we control for
whether they have a history of mixed outcomes (see below).
18 The number of observations affected by the sampling restrictions is
small and the estimates from the two samples are nearly identical.
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First, we investigate whether the occurrence of unrest
deters inward FDI (Models 1–5). We find that unrest is
moderately associated with reduced capital flows. When
we look closer at the nature of each conflict, however,
we find that the relationship is driven exclusively by
those campaigns that adopt predominately violent tac-
tics. The findings indicate that violence is strongly asso-
ciated with reductions in investment during the course
of the campaign. Conversely, periods of non-violent
unrest have no discernible (statistically significant) effect
on investment.
Second, we explore the longer term effects of unrest
on the health of the market (Models 6–8). We find that
unrest has the potential to generate high opportunity
costs. However, a history of violence does not indepen-
dently impact post-conflict FDI flows. Instead, states’ eco-
nomic trajectories are shaped by whether or not
campaigns successfully achieve their aims. States with
campaigns that result in a successful outcome are far less
likely to experience a reduction in investment—regard-
less of the predominant tactics—than are states with
unsuccessful campaigns.
Models 1–7: Does Unrest Deter FDI?
Our theory predicts that FDI flows are lower into coun-
tries experiencing political unrest than in their more sta-
ble counterparts. A Wooldridge test rejects the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation (F = 61.44) and a
Breusch-Pagan test confirms the presence of heteroske-
dasticity (p < .000). Given the traits exhibited by our data
we use panel-corrected standard errors with a lagged
dependent variable.19 This method produces more pre-
cise standard errors. The model equation takes on the
following specification:
FDIi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Unresti;t þ b2Zi;t þ ai þ li;t
where Zi;t represents a vector of controls, and li;t is the
panel-corrected error term.
Model 1 provides a good overall fit to the data
( Table 2). The R2 is 0.44 and there is no evidence that
multicollinearity biases the estimates (none of the covari-
ates are correlated at more than 54%). The controls
behave largely as expected, which builds our confidence
in the model specification. Lagged FDI is naturally a
strong predictor of investment in year t. States with more
open capital accounts and richer nations also enjoy com-
paratively larger inflows of FDI. And, importantly, democ-
racies receive larger inflows of foreign capital, supporting
the logic that investors respond favorably to democratic
institutions.
Turning to our explanatory variable, the coefficient
on Unresti;t is negative and significant, suggesting that
periods of domestic political unrest have a dampening
effect on FDI. The substantive effects are illustrated in
Figure 2. Unrest is associated with a 15% drop in invest-
ment, or a decrease from 2.78% of GDP [2.57, 2.99] to
2.36 [2.04, 2.69].20 This drop suggests that there is a
significant opportunity cost associated with unrest.
Domestic markets undergoing periods of unrest are
comparatively less attractive investment opportunities for
foreign investors.
However, Unresti;t masks the precise nature of the con-
flict. Our theory predicts that violence ought to have a
uniquely powerful dampening effect on FDI. Violent
conflicts suggest greater unrest to the market in both the
short- and long-term. Periods of unrest last four times
longer on average when the predominant tactics are vio-
lent.21 Moreover, only 27% of violent campaigns end in
success, whilst nearly 60% of nonviolent campaigns end
successfully.
In light of these patterns, the market should be wary of
economies marred by violent unrest. In Model 2, we
explore this relationship by using our disaggregated
measures of violence and non-violence (Table 2).22
Model 2 reveals that the relationship between unrest and
FDI is driven entirely by the use of violence. States
afflicted by violent unrest experience a 17% decrease in
FDI from 2.78 [2.57, 2.99] to 2.29 [1.94, 2.64]. The pres-
ence of non-violent unrest, to the contrary, has no dis-
cernible effect on investment. Non-violent unrest results
in a comparatively negligible 5% drop in FDI from the
same baseline of 2.78 [2.57, 2.99] to 2.68 [2.15, 3.07].
Thus, violence has a substantial effect on market out-
comes; investors are far more likely to avoid economies
afflicted by violent unrest.
The findings provide insights into the sometimes
ambiguous relationships between political unrest and
market outcomes. The null result for non-violence sug-
gests that the market is not sensitive to the occurrence of
unrest broadly defined. Instead, each campaign’s chosen
tactics matter a great deal. Only when events turn violent
does the market appear to respond.
We subject these findings to a variety of robustness
checks. To begin with, Model 3 employs an AR.1 process
rather than the lagged dependent variable to correct for
time dependence. Model 4 includes the WGI measure for
rule of law. As mentioned above, this variable hugely
truncates our sample. However, the results are consistent
in both of these specifications (Table 2).
Moreover, the relationship between unrest and FDI
may be shaped by each campaign’s political aims. The
sample varies with respect to the underlying causes of
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
FDIi;t 2.60 4.75 82.81 43.82
Unresti;t 0.11 0.32 0 1
Violenti;t 0.08 0.28 0 1
Non-violenti;t 0.02 0.16 0 1
Successi;t 0.45 0.49 0 1
Incomei;t 7.29 1.41 4.05 11.6
Democracyi;t 0.38 0.49 0 1
Aidi;t 0.13 0.19 0.02 2.77
Tradei;t 0.78 1.41 0 48.73
Growthi;t 3.77 6.66 51.03 106.28
CapitalControlsi;t 0.21 1.44 1.81 2.53
MultipleCampaignsi;t 0.01 0.08 0 1
Rule of Lawi;t 0.06 1.02 2.04 2.12
Stabilityi;t 12.40 12.57 0 41
Fractionalizationi;t 0.47 0.25 0 0.93
InfantMortalityi;t 63.49 46.89 2.30 284.78
19 The results remain the same when using an AR.1 process to correct for
time dependence rather than the lagged DV.
20 Brackets report the 95% confidence interval.
21 Violent campaigns last an average of 7.88 years while non-violent cam-
paigns only last an average of 1.79 years.
22 Using both indicators in the same equation ensures that the reference
category is years of no unrest. Therefore, we get a direct comparison of the
impacts of violent and non-violent campaigns on FDI relative to that of peace.
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unrest. The vast majority of campaigns concern regime
change (75%). However, there are also a number of cam-
paigns motivated by a desire for secession (14%) and self-
determination (8%). It is possible that certain motiva-
tions are perceived to be more or less disruptive to the
market. As stated above, many of these aims are likely to
lead to additional turmoil during periods of reform. To
control for this possibility, we introduce dichotomous
indicators for each of these different aims in Model 5
(Table 2).23 We find that they do not affect the substan-
tive interpretation of the baseline results (Figure 2).24
Notice that the only aim with a significant result is regime
change. Campaigns directed toward regime change
receive comparatively larger inflows of FDI. This provides
support for the intuition that domestic political reforms
—specifically, moves toward democratization—are viewed
favorably by the market. From Model 5 we conclude that
violence has a strong independent effect on FDI even
when controlling for the political motivations of each
campaign.
Our results may also be contaminated by selection bias.
States select themselves into unrest non-randomly. Failing
to correct for this selection process may lead to false
inferences. We estimate a Heckman selection model
designed to correct for this bias. The selection equation
predicts whether a country experiences unrest. The out-
come equation then predicts FDI flows.
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TABLE 2. Does Unrest Deter FDI?
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables
Unresti;t Violenti;t Violenti;t Violenti;t Violenti;t
PCSE PCSE AR.1 w/ROL w/aims
Unresti;t 0.418 (0.159)**
Violenti;t 0.490 (0.176)** 0.799 (0.383)* 2.011 (0.840)* 0.781 (0.253)**
Non-violenti;t 0.169 (0.224) 0.343 (0.259) 0.685 (0.892) 0.460 (0.257)
RegimeChangei;t 0.630 (0.205)**
Self -Determinationi;t 0.186 (0.330)
Secessioni;t 0.175 (0.287)
Incomei;t 0.217 (0.066)** 0.213 (0.066)** 0.433 (0.162)** 0.437 (0.284) 0.017 (0.129)
Democracyi;t 0.269 (0.106)** 0.275 (0.106)** 0.492 (0.269) 0.058 (0.676) 0.032 (0.160)
Aidi;t 0.057 (0.584) 0.067 (0.584) 1.147 (1.270) 1.337 (2.835) 1.295 (1.538)
Tradei;t 0.285 (0.183) 0.283 (0.183) 0.017 (0.384) 1.960 (0.312)** 0.372 (0.225)*
Growthi;t 0.010 (0.016) 0.010 (0.016) 0.001 (0.012) 0.037 (0.063) 0.018 (0.031)
CapitalControlsi;t 0.143 (0.055)* 0.142 (0.056)** 0.307 (0.117)** 0.065 (0.170) 0.218 (0.097)*
FDIi;t1 0.616 (0.045)** 0.616 (0.045)** 0.478 (0.096)** 0.480 (0.094)**
MultipleCampaignsi;t 0.224 (0.242) 0.212 (0.243) 0.184 (0.279) 0.360 (0.272)
Rule of Lawi;t 0.882 (0.267)**
Constant 0.281 (0.516) 0.251 (0.516) 0.175 (1.219) 0.512 (2.403) 1.624 (1.108)
Observations 3,973 3,973 4,022 320 1,580
R2 .44 .44 .03 .67 .35
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses *p < .05, **p < .001.
23 This leaves “other” aims as our omitted category.
24 The results are actually strong when controlling for campaign aims. Pre-
dicted FDI flows into countries experiencing violent unrest are 30% lower,
falling from 2.61 [2.33, 2.89] to 1.83 [1.39, 2.27].
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The selection equation relies on a number of measures
to ensure that the system is identified properly.25 Specifi-
cally, The probability of unrest should likewise increase
in the social stratification of society. We include an indi-
cator of ethnic Fractionalizationi;t , which is designed to
capture socioeconomic cleavages that may lead to (or cre-
ate conditions conducive to) unrest. Overall levels of pov-
erty, not just the inequality level, may also affect the
likelihood of unrest. To capture levels of poverty, we
include a measure of InfantMortalityi;t , which is the num-
ber of deaths per 1,000 children.
The selection equation also includes our measures of
income and regime type since both wealth and
democratic institutions shape the likelihood that unrest
occurs. Finally, we include a simple count of the number
of years of Stabilityi;t that preceded the outbreak of
unrest. 26 The system of equations is structured as follows,
with the selection equation written as:
Unresti;t ¼ b0 þ b1Fractionalizationi;t1 þ b2InfantMortalityi;t1
þ b3Stabilityi;t1 þ b4Incomei;t1 þ b5Democracyi;t1
þ b6FDIi;t1 þ gi;t
where all of the right-hand side variables are lagged one
year and gi;t represents the error term. The outcome
equation is the same as that specified above in Model 1:
FDIi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Incomei;t þ b2Democracyi;t þ b3PTAi;t
þ b4FDIi;t1 þ b5MultipleCampaignsi;t þ li;t
Before discussing the full selection model, we report the
selection equation separately to clarify its performance.
Model 6 in Table 3 is a simple probit model with robust
standard errors designed to ensure that we are predicting
unrest effectively in the selection stage. The model pro-
vides a good overall fit to the data. Richer countries,
democracies, and those experiencing longer periods of
stability are all significantly less likely to experience unrest.
The Model 7 estimates the full Heckman (Table 3).
First, note that the chi-squared statistic is 5.72 (p < .016),
which justifies taking a closer look at selection effects.
More generally, the model provides a good overall fit to
the data. In the selection equation, previous FDI inflows,
income, democracy, and the length of time states have
been stable are all negatively associated with unrest. In
the outcome equation, the results echo the baseline esti-
mates in Model 2. Violence is negatively and significantly
related to FDI inflows during the years of ongoing insta-
bility. Violent campaigns lead to a 13% reduction in FDI
once correcting for non-random selection into unrest.
This represents only a modest decrease in the effect
reported in Model 2.
The findings provide strong support for H2. While
there appears to be an association between unrest and
FDI (H1), further investigation reveals that violence has a
strong, independent effect on market outcomes. Investors
are wary of economies characterized by high levels of
uncertainty. Uncertainty is greater for markets where
domestic political unrest is violent. Thus, these econo-
mies receive comparatively lower levels of FDI.
Importantly, this result is not contingent on the nature
of the political aims of the campaigns. Nor is it an artifact
of how states “select” themselves into periods of unrest.
By implication, further investigations of political unrest’s
effects on the market must take variation in campaign
tactics into account.
Models 8–10: What are the Long-Term Effects of Unrest?
The baseline estimates show that violence deters FDI dur-
ing the years instability is ongoing. However, unrest’s
opportunity costs likely extend beyond the duration of
the campaign. In this section, we explore the lasting
effects that unrest has on the market.
The theory predicts that post-unrest investment flows
are determined in large part by how campaigns end. Spe-
cifically, when campaigns end successfully, the resulting
political climate is comparatively more stable. Conse-
quently, we ought to observe higher levels of FDI into
states where unrest came to a successful conclusion.
We start by looking at the association between violence
and FDI. Since violence dampens capital flows during
periods of unrest it may also leave a lasting impression on
the market, particularly given that it is strongly associated
with success. Model 8 tests the proposition that a history
of violence—defined as whether or not past campaigns
used violent tactics—deters FDI in the years after unrest
has concluded. Note that we again rely on Heckman
selection models for the tests in this section. There are
theoretical and econometric reasons for this. First, the
long-term effects of violence (or success) on FDI are likely
to be shaped by the very same factors that predispose
TABLE 3. Does Unrest Deter FDI?
Model (6) (7)
Variables Unresti;t Unresti;t FDIi;t
Violenti;t 1.532
(0.722)*
Fractionalizationi;t1 0.367
(0.120)**
0.156
(0.124)
InfantMortalityi;t1 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Stabilityi;t1 0.066
(0.005)**
0.054
(0.011)**
Incomei;t1 0.181
(0.030)**
0.163
(0.033)**
0.214
(0.257)
Democracyi;t1 0.290
(0.066)**
0.165
(0.073)*
0.155
(0.337)
FDIi;t1 0.039
(0.014)**
0.028
(0.012)*
0.881
(0.373)*
Aidi;t 3.091
(2.491)
Tradei;t 0.211
(0.199)
Growthi;t 0.065
(0.053)
CapitalControlsi;t 0.012
(0.127)
MultipleCampaignsi;t 0.790
(0.400)*
Constant 0.983 (0.258)** 0.517 (0.325) 6.215
(2.940)*
Observations 4,309 4,232
Standard errors in parentheses *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001.
25 Heckman models are weakly identified based on assumptions about
similarity in the distributions of the dependent variables. This assumption is
not often met in practice. Consequently, we introduce several variables that
ought to be strong predictors of unrest and weak predictors of FDI.
26 We also ran models using polynomial terms—Stabilityi;t squared and
cubed—to account for temporal dependence and the results remained consis-
tent.
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states to unrest in the first place. Second, the chi-squared
test statistic in Model 7 is sufficient to suggest that selec-
tion effects may be at play. Third, we want to compare
the different experiences of states emerging from unrest.
In Models 1–5, the reference category was all country-
years, regardless of whether or not there was unrest.
Here, we want to know what shapes economic outcomes
in only those states with a prior history of domestic politi-
cal unrest.
Model 8 uses the same specification as outlined above,
where the selection equation predicts unrest and the out-
come equation predicts FDI flows. However, the sample
in the outcome equation is now restricted to years after a
period of unrest. Since we are interested in post-unrest
FDI the sample does not include observations prior to
(or during) active campaigns. Nor does it include any
observations from countries that have not experienced
unrest at all.
Model 8 finds no evidence that violence has a statisti-
cally significant independent effect on post-unrest FDI
(see Table 4). The coefficient on Violenti;t does not
approach significance and we cannot conclude that a his-
tory of violence per se has a long-term effect on the mar-
ket. Importantly, this null finding is not inconsistent with
our expectations. For the reasons outlined in our theory,
we expect that outcomes affect post-unrest FDI more
than tactics. While these two traits of each campaign are
related, the singular importance of outcomes—that is,
success—may overwhelm the independent effect of
violence. In other words, what matters to the market
is an expectation about whether their investments are
vulnerable to conflict renewal.
This is borne out in the real world where countries
that experienced horrifying and protracted civil conflict
have subsequently seen considerable increases in FDI fol-
lowing the success of violent campaigns. For example,
Rwanda experienced impressive post-conflict FDI growth,
in spite of the difficulties associated with their history of
violence—for example, the high human cost of conflict,
the lengthy reconciliation period, etc. Indeed, FDI
increased dramatically from 0.2% of GDP in 1994 to over
2.0% in the current decade.
Model 9 introduces our indicator of success into the out-
come equation. The results show that markets whose cam-
paigns end with successful resolution attract significantly
greater levels of inward investment.27 Success is associated
with an average post-unrest FDI inflow of 3.44 [3.14, 4.74]
as compared to 2.78 [2.58, 2.98] for states that experience
failure. The mean across the sample of post-unrest years is
2.90 so this 0.7-point jump in FDI as a % of GDP repre-
sents a significant boost.
Success appears to be a key determinant of a state’s
capacity to attract FDI in the wake of unrest. The implica-
tions are important; when campaigns end unsuccessfully
the deleterious effects that unrest has on the market
extend beyond the years of political instability. The threat
of renewed conflict and, in particular, renewed violence,
continues to deter risk-averse investors even if campaigns
have come to an end.
Before concluding, we subject this proposition to some
additional testing. We have shown that success is a strong
predictor of FDI and that violence appears to play a less
significant role. However, we have highlighted through-
out this paper that tactics and outcomes are closely
linked. Specifically, violent campaigns are far less likely,
for the variety of reasons discussed above, to achieve their
aims than non-violent ones. Moreover, success may not
matter for long-term FDI if the preceding campaign was
violent. Violence may lead to damaged productive capac-
ity, human capital flight, and a variety of other things
that may reduce returns on investments. Thus, even if
campaigns are successful, sufficient damage may have
already been done to the domestic economy to deter FDI
for some time into the future.
Model 10 looks at whether success has a positive effect
on post-unrest FDI once adjusting for non-random selec-
tion into violence, not just into unrest. The estimates are
reported in Table 4. The results of the outcomes equa-
tion are consistent with those produced by Model 9. Suc-
cessful outcomes result in significantly greater inflows of
post-unrest FDI, even in the sub-sample of countries with
a history of violence.
To further test the durability of our findings, we con-
trolled for several indicators of stability. We introduced a
binary indicator of whether or not a state relapsed
into unrest within 5 years of the previous campaign’s
TABLE 4. What are the long-term effects of unrest?
Model (8) (9) (10)
Variables Unresti;t FDIi;t Unresti;t FDIi;t Violenti;t FDIi;t
Violenti;t 0.016 (0.157)
Successi;t 0.660 (0.176)** 0.439 (0.188)*
Fractionalizationi;t1 1.561 (0.203)** 1.559 (0.203)** 0.156 (0.098)
InfantMortalityi;t1 0.023 (0.002)** 0.023 (0.002)** 0.004 (0.001)**
Stabilityi;t1 0.278 (0.014)** 0.278 (0.014)** 0.010 (0.005)*
Incomei;t1 0.653 (0.061)** 0.122 (0.087) 0.652 (0.061)** 0.075 (0.084) 0.096 (0.037)* 0.499 (0.132)**
Democracyi;t1 0.688 (0.104)** 0.136 (0.176) 0.686 (0.104)** 0.175 (0.175) 0.519 (0.071)** 1.409 (0.262)**
FDIi;t1 0.040 (0.006)** 0.357 (0.090)** 0.040 (0.006)** 0.348 (0.090)** 0.035 (0.015)* 0.309 (0.069)**
Aidi;t 1.355 (0.916) 1.326 (0.890) 0.900 (0.542)
Tradei;t 0.002 (0.389) 0.039 (0.391) 0.214 (0.150)
Growthi;t 0.010 (0.022) 0.015 (0.022) 0.011 (0.016)
CapitalControlsi;t 0.429 (0.076)** 0.403 (0.076)** 0.242 (0.069)**
Constant 6.158 (0.527)** 1.168 (0.608) 6.146 (0.526)** 1.197 (0.576)* 0.537 (0.292) 2.884 (0.866)**
Observations 3,575 3,575 1,102
Standard errors in parentheses *p < .05, **p < .001.
27 In some states that have experienced multiple periods of unrest there
have been varied outcomes. We controlled for whether there were any past
failures and found that the results remain constant.
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conclusion. This is a direct measure of whether instability
continues to afflict states (and their markets) over time.
Moreover, we added a control for the duration of the cam-
paign. This ought to approximate the cost of unrest to the
state and economy, assuming that costs are increasing in
time. Finally, in separate models we controlled for the dif-
ference in Polity scores—that is, the level of democratiza-
tion—for the 5- and 10-year periods after unrest. In all of
these cases, the additional controls were signed correctly.
Relapse into subsequent unrest and the duration of each
campaign are both negatively associated with FDI. Democ-
ratization, conversely, is positively associated with FDI.
However, in each of these models our core result remained
robustly unchanged.
The evidence supports the claim that outcomes have a
significant impact on the long-term consequences of
unrest. Markets in states with campaigns that achieve
their aims seem to recover their abilities to attract capital.
This relationship holds even when the campaign has
been marred by violent tactics, which we show dampen
FDI during the years of unrest themselves.
Conclusions
This paper asks two related questions. First, does domes-
tic political unrest deter inward FDI? Second, does unrest
leave a lasting impact on the market? We argue that peri-
ods of violent unrest signal greater risk to the market
than non-violent periods. Violence is associated with a
greater likelihood of an unsuccessful outcome to the
campaign. Markets are wary of states where campaigns
have ended in failure, because although success can be
costly in many ways, unsuccessful campaigns often precip-
itate recurrent cycles of violence. By extension, markets
receive less FDI when campaigns are violent and when
they are unsuccessful. We find strong evidence in favor of
these propositions, even after taking political motivations
and non-random selection into account.
The theory and evidence make a number of contribu-
tions. First, it provides a theoretically-motivated clarifica-
tion of the empirical ambiguity in the relationship
between unrest and FDI. Previous studies have returned
mixed support for the proposition that unrest deters FDI,
in spite of investors’ supposed aversion to political risk.
Here, we show that periods of unrest vary significantly in
character and, by extension, the effects they have on mar-
ket outcomes.
Second, and related, the paper identifies a specific
channel through which unrest affects states’ welfare.
Existing work shows that dampened growth and develop-
ment are among unrest’s various opportunity costs, for
example, Collier (1999). We do not test FDI’s growth-
generating effects directly in this paper. However, we
help specify the conditions under which states are more
or less likely to receive investment. This may have impor-
tant implications for understanding how unrest shapes
states’ longer-term development trajectories.
Third, the evidence supports the intuition that inves-
tors respond to perceptions of markets’ future stability.
The historical record shows that violent tactics and unsuc-
cessful campaigns tend to signal longer lasting (and
repeated) unrest. The differential effects that tactics and
outcomes have on FDI flows suggest that investors rely on
these signals to inform their decisions about host mar-
kets. With this idea in mind, close attention should be
paid to the many countries that have experienced politi-
cal unrest as part of the Arab Spring. This wave of pro-
democracy protests and civil wars provides notable varia-
tion in both the tactics (non-violent events in Tunisia and
Egypt, and violent events in Libya and Syria) and the out-
comes (tentatively successful change in Tunisia but not in
Bahrain, for instance) of conflict. Thus, the events of the
Arab Spring ought to provide a suitable set of test cases
for our logic as events continue to clarify themselves.
Fourth, previous work suggests that foreign support
plays a crucial role in enabling non-violence (Chenoweth
and Stephan 2011). Investors wishing to insulate their
capital from risk have clear material incentives to encour-
age their governments to support non-violent campaigns
in countries in which they hold investments or are con-
templating investing. Our results do not speak to the role
investors might play in the onset or duration of unrest.
However, they do show that investors are wary of violence.
Firms already operating within markets have strong
reasons to promote non-violence when unrest does occur.
Additional avenues for future research remain open.
We stressed that a fuller account of how political instabil-
ity shapes the market must consider variation across dif-
ferent forms of unrest. To that end, we explored how
tactics and outcomes condition FDI flows in the short-
and long-term. However, these are just two items on a
lengthy list of factors that likely inform investors’ percep-
tions of risk. For example, while our results do not pro-
vide strong evidence relating to campaigns’ political
motivations, further research ought to be carried out in
this area.
Finally, this paper does not look at variation in inves-
tors’ own sensitivities to risk. Some investors may thrive
on political instability. For the reasons stated above, it is
unlikely that this is a widespread phenomenon. However,
if at least some investors respond favorably to risk, then
FDI may lead to protracted conflicts and do very little to
assist in the economic recovery of states. More work has
to be done on the relationship between specific indus-
tries/sectors and unrest as well as between FDI and dura-
tion of unrest.
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